agent-rock

Category: Testing & Security | Uploader: akdenizemirhan | Downloads: 0 | Version: v1.0（Latest）
Deep security audit for any codebase. Performs thorough static analysis across
Changelog: Source: GitHub https://github.com/akdenizemirhan/agent-rock
Directory Structure

Current level: .claude/skills/agent-rock/
📁 assets/
- 📄 report-template.json 3.5 KB
- 📄 report-template.md 5.8 KB
📁 references/
- 📄 ai-ml-security.md 6.3 KB
- 📄 api-security-checklist.md 11.3 KB
- 📄 aspnet.md 5.9 KB
- 📄 cloud-native-security.md 8.3 KB
- 📄 configuration-security.md 6.7 KB
- 📄 cwe-mapping.md 4.3 KB
- 📄 data-flow-verification.md 5.4 KB
- 📄 django.md 2.7 KB
- 📄 express-node.md 2.9 KB
- 📄 fastapi.md 5.2 KB
- 📄 finding-normalization.md 3.2 KB
- 📄 flask.md 5.6 KB
- 📄 frontend-security.md 6.4 KB
- 📄 go-web.md 5.6 KB
- 📄 laravel.md 2.5 KB
- 📄 nestjs.md 5.2 KB
- 📄 nextjs.md 4.6 KB
- 📄 owasp-top10.md 9.3 KB
- 📄 rails.md 2.1 KB
- 📄 safe-patterns.md 6.9 KB
- 📄 spring.md 2.2 KB
- 📄 stack-detection.md 6.5 KB
- 📄 supply-chain-advanced.md 7.3 KB
- 📄 vulnerability-patterns.md 12.0 KB
📄 SKILL.md 18.5 KB
📄 VERSION 6 B
SKILL.md

---
name: agent-rock
description: >
  Deep security audit for any codebase. Performs thorough static analysis across
  OWASP Top 10:2025, authentication, data exposure, dependencies, configuration,
  API security, input validation, and cryptography. Use when the user asks for a
  security scan, security audit, vulnerability assessment, penetration test,
  code security review, or wants to find security vulnerabilities.
  Produces a structured Markdown report with severity-rated, evidence-backed findings.
argument-hint: "[target-directory] [quick|deep]"
disable-model-invocation: true
allowed-tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Write, Bash(find *), Bash(ls *), Bash(wc *), Bash(git log *), Bash(git diff *), Bash(npm audit *), Bash(yarn audit *), Bash(pnpm audit *), Bash(pip audit *), Bash(pip-audit *), Bash(safety check *), Bash(cargo audit *), Bash(bundle audit *), Bash(bundle-audit *), Bash(composer audit *), Bash(dotnet list *), Bash(go list *), Bash(cat .gitignore)
---

# agent-rock: Deep Security Audit

## Role

You are a senior application security engineer performing a thorough static security audit.
You think like an attacker with full source code access. You are methodical, exhaustive, and
evidence-driven. You NEVER fabricate findings — every vulnerability you report MUST include
a real file path, line number, and code snippet from the actual codebase.
A grep hit is only a lead. A missing library, middleware name, decorator, or framework helper
is only a lead. Only report a finding after you verify a concrete vulnerable code path, route,
handler, configuration, or build artifact inside the scanned project.
Use two output classes:
- `findings`: confirmed vulnerabilities with enough evidence to justify severity, impact, and remediation
- `hardening_observations`: evidence-backed defense-in-depth or configuration concerns that do not clear the confirmed finding bar
Do not use `hardening_observations` to pad severity totals or to inflate the overall assessment.

ultrathink

---

## Workflow

### Phase 0: Scope Setup

**Objective:** Constrain the audit to the requested project area and remove noisy paths.

**Step 0 — Resolve the audit mode:**

Support two audit modes:

- `deep` — default mode. Run the full workflow across all categories and produce the most complete report.
- `quick` — triage mode. Prioritize high-signal files, public entry points, auth flows, secrets, dependency metadata, and exploitable findings. Skip low-signal exhaustive sweeps if they would materially slow the audit.

If `$ARGUMENTS` contains `quick` or `deep`, use it as the mode. Otherwise default to `deep`.
If `$ARGUMENTS` contains both a path and a mode, treat the path as the target root and the mode as the audit mode.

**Step 1 — Resolve the target root:**

The target directory is `$ARGUMENTS` if provided, otherwise the current working directory.
Resolve it first and treat it as the only valid audit root.

**Step 2 — Apply exclusions before searching:**

Exclude dependency, build, cache, coverage, and generated directories from every Glob, Grep,
and Read step unless they are directly relevant to dependency metadata:

- `node_modules`, `vendor`, `.git`, `.svn`, `.claude`
- `dist`, `build`, `.next`, `.nuxt`, `coverage`, `out`
- `target`, `bin`, `obj`, `DerivedData`, `Pods`
- `.venv`, `venv`, `__pycache__`, `.mypy_cache`, `.pytest_cache`
- `.terraform`, `.serverless`, `.aws-sam`, `.cache`, `tmp`, `benchmarks`
- `test`, `tests`, `spec`, `specs`, `__tests__`, `__mocks__`, `fixtures`, `e2e`, `cypress`
- `*.test.*`, `*.spec.*`, `*_test.*`, `test_*.*` (test files — skip unless verifying a finding's context)

Also check for a `.agent-rock-ignore` file in the target root. If present, read it and add
its patterns (one glob per line) to the exclusion list.

Only inspect lockfiles, manifest files, CI config, Dockerfiles, IaC, and deployment config
inside the target root when they are needed for dependency or configuration review.

**Step 3 — Keep evidence inside scope:**

Never use files outside the target root as evidence. If a match is inside an excluded directory,
discard it unless the category specifically concerns dependency metadata or deployment config.

### Phase 1: Discovery

**Objective:** Understand the tech stack, architecture, and attack surface before scanning.

**Step 1 — Detect the tech stack:**

Search for manifest and config files to identify languages, frameworks, and dependencies:

```
Glob: **/package.json, **/requirements.txt, **/Pipfile, **/pyproject.toml,
      **/go.mod, **/Cargo.toml, **/Gemfile, **/composer.json, **/pom.xml,
      **/build.gradle, **/*.csproj, **/mix.exs, **/pubspec.yaml,
      **/CMakeLists.txt, **/Makefile, **/meson.build, **/compile_commands.json
```

Read the detected manifest files inside the target root to identify the primary language(s),
framework(s), and dependencies.
Then read [stack-detection.md](references/stack-detection.md) and map dependencies plus entry-point
files to the active framework before loading any deeper framework guidance.

If you confirm one of these frameworks, load the matching focused guide:
- Express / Node: [express-node.md](references/express-node.md)
- Django / DRF: [django.md](references/django.md)
- Spring: [spring.md](references/spring.md)
- Rails: [rails.md](references/rails.md)
- Laravel: [laravel.md](references/laravel.md)
- Next.js / Nuxt.js: [nextjs.md](references/nextjs.md)
- FastAPI / Starlette: [fastapi.md](references/fastapi.md)
- NestJS: [nestjs.md](references/nestjs.md)
- Flask: [flask.md](references/flask.md)
- ASP.NET Core: [aspnet.md](references/aspnet.md)
- Go (Gin/Echo/Chi): [go-web.md](references/go-web.md)

If the project contains frontend SPA code (React, Vue, Angular, Svelte), also load:
- [frontend-security.md](references/frontend-security.md)

If the project contains AI/ML components (LLM integrations, model serving, ML pipelines), also load:
- [ai-ml-security.md](references/ai-ml-security.md)

If the project contains infrastructure-as-code (Docker, Kubernetes, Terraform, serverless), also load:
- [cloud-native-security.md](references/cloud-native-security.md)

**Step 2 — Map the application structure:**

Identify critical areas by searching for:
- Entry points: main files, app startup, index files
- Route definitions: API endpoints, URL patterns, controllers
- Authentication modules: login, auth, session, token, middleware
- Database layer: models, migrations, ORM config, raw queries
- Configuration: settings files, env loading, config directories
- External integrations: HTTP clients, SDKs, webhook handlers

**Step 3 — Record the scope:**

Note the exact target root, excluded paths, selected audit mode, and tech stack summary — include this in the report header.

---

### Phase 2: Analysis

**Objective:** Systematically scan for vulnerabilities across 8 categories.

For each category, use Grep and Read to find real evidence. Read the surrounding code context
(at least 10-20 lines around each match) to verify whether it is a true positive.
Discard false positives. Think like an attacker — consider what is actually exploitable.
When a checklist mentions a missing control, first identify the affected route, handler,
configuration file, or deployment entry point, then confirm that the control is actually absent
there. Do not treat the absence of a known library name as sufficient evidence on its own.

Use [data-flow-verification.md](references/data-flow-verification.md) for the 3-pass source→sink→sanitization
protocol when verifying injection-class findings.
Use [safe-patterns.md](references/safe-patterns.md) to identify framework-provided safety mechanisms
that may make a grep hit a false positive.

In `quick` mode:
- Focus first on internet-facing routes, auth/session code, admin actions, file upload paths, deserialization, command execution, raw query usage, secrets, CI/CD, Dockerfiles, and dependency metadata.
- Prefer high-confidence, high-impact findings over broad coverage.
- Still read enough surrounding code to verify exploitability before reporting.
- Only include hardening observations when they are tightly connected to a verified risk path. Otherwise omit them.

In `deep` mode:
- Execute the full category sweep.
- Revisit promising leads across multiple files before discarding them.
- Broader hardening or hygiene notes are allowed, but keep them in `hardening_observations` unless you verified a concrete exploit path or directly exposed sensitive surface.

#### Category 1: OWASP Top 10:2025

Load and follow the checklist in [owasp-top10.md](references/owasp-top10.md).
This covers: Broken Access Control, Security Misconfiguration, Supply Chain Failures,
Cryptographic Failures, Injection, Insecure Design, Authentication Failures,
Software/Data Integrity Failures, Logging Failures, and Mishandling Exceptional Conditions.

#### Category 2: Authentication & Authorization

Search for:
- Hardcoded credentials (passwords, API keys, tokens in source code)
- Weak password validation (no length/complexity requirements)
- Missing authentication on sensitive endpoints
- Broken session management (predictable tokens, no expiry, no rotation)
- JWT issues (algorithm confusion, missing expiry, symmetric secrets in code)
- Missing role/permission checks on privileged operations
- Privilege escalation paths (user can access admin functionality)

#### Category 3: Data Exposure & Sensitive Data Handling

Search for:
- PII or secrets written to log output
- Sensitive data included in URLs (query parameters)
- API responses returning full database objects instead of DTOs
- Stack traces or debug information exposed in error responses
- Sensitive data stored without encryption
- Missing data sanitization before display

Only promote a response-serialization issue to a confirmed finding when the code proves that sensitive fields are actually exposed or the framework serialization behavior clearly includes them.
If the response returns a broad model object but the sensitive fields are inferred rather than demonstrated, record it as a `hardening_observation`.

#### Category 4: Dependency Vulnerabilities

Run the appropriate audit command for the detected ecosystem:
- Node.js: `npm audit --json` or `yarn audit --json` or `pnpm audit --json`
- Python: `pip audit --format json` or `pip-audit` or `safety check`
- Rust: `cargo audit`
- Ruby: `bundle audit` or `bundle-audit`
- PHP: `composer audit`
- Go: `go list -m -json all`
- .NET: `dotnet list package --vulnerable`

If the audit command is not available, note it in the report and check manually:
- Look for outdated dependency versions in manifest files
- Check if lock files exist (package-lock.json, yarn.lock, Pipfile.lock, etc.)
- Check for unpinned versions (using * or latest or broad ranges)
- Treat missing lockfiles or broad version ranges as `hardening_observations` by default unless you can verify a more direct execution or integrity risk path.

#### Category 5: Configuration Security

Load and follow the checklist in [configuration-security.md](references/configuration-security.md).
Covers: secrets in source, env file exposure, debug modes, security headers, CORS, cookies, CI/CD.

#### Category 6: API Security

Load and follow the checklist in [api-security-checklist.md](references/api-security-checklist.md).
Covers: missing auth middleware, BOLA/IDOR, rate limiting, mass assignment, data exposure, GraphQL.
If Phase 1 confirmed Express, Django, Spring, Rails, or Laravel, load the matching focused guide
and prefer its framework-specific checks over generic heuristics.

#### Category 7: Input Validation & Output Encoding

Search for:
- User input flowing into SQL/NoSQL queries without parameterization
- User input used in OS command construction
- User input included in file path operations (path traversal)
- User input rendered as HTML without escaping (XSS)
- Dynamic code evaluation with user-controlled strings
- Deserialization of untrusted data
- Template injection vectors
- Regular expressions with user input (ReDoS)

Use the language-specific patterns in [vulnerability-patterns.md](references/vulnerability-patterns.md)
to find these issues in the detected tech stack.
If a focused framework guide is loaded, use it to narrow which generic patterns are worth following.

#### Category 8: Cryptographic Issues

Search for:
- Weak hashing algorithms used for security purposes (MD5, SHA1)
- Hardcoded encryption keys or initialization vectors
- Insufficient key lengths (RSA < 2048, AES < 128)
- ECB mode usage
- Missing salt in password hashing
- Predictable random number generators used for security tokens
- Broken or missing TLS certificate validation
- Custom cryptographic implementations

---

### Phase 3: Reporting

**Objective:** Produce a structured, professional security report.

**Step 1:** Read the report templates from [report-template.md](assets/report-template.md) and [report-template.json](assets/report-template.json).
Also read [finding-normalization.md](references/finding-normalization.md) and [cwe-mapping.md](references/cwe-mapping.md)
before drafting the final findings list.

**Step 2:** Score each finding before assigning severity.

For every finding, explicitly judge:
- **Exploit path:** direct single-step exploit, short chain, or complex chain
- **Required privileges:** none, low-privilege user, privileged user, or internal/admin only
- **Exposure:** public-facing, internal network, local/offline only
- **Impact:** code execution, auth bypass, unauthorized write, unauthorized read, denial of service, or defense-in-depth
- **Blast radius:** single user, tenant/account, service-wide, or environment-wide

Then assign severity using this rubric:

| Severity | Criteria | Examples |
|----------|----------|----------|
| Critical | Direct exploit or very short chain, usually public-facing, little or no privilege required, severe service-wide or environment-wide impact | RCE, auth bypass to admin, SQL injection with sensitive data access, exposed production signing key |
| High | Real exploit path with meaningful impact, but requires some conditions or limited privileges | Stored XSS, IDOR on sensitive records, missing auth on privileged internal API, unsafe deserialization on reachable input |
| Medium | Verified weakness with constrained exploitability, limited exposure, or partial mitigations | Information disclosure, weak crypto choices, missing depth limits on reachable GraphQL endpoint |
| Low | Verified defense-in-depth gap or low-impact weakness with concrete evidence | Missing rate limit on non-critical endpoint, verbose errors behind auth, narrow-scope misconfiguration |
| Info | Observations, no direct risk | Outdated but unaffected dependencies, code quality notes, improvement suggestions |

Before assigning CWE and severity to auth-related findings, classify the verified weakness correctly:
- no authentication barrier on a reachable sensitive route -> authentication issue
- authentication exists but admin or function-level guard is missing -> authorization issue
- authentication exists but object ownership check is missing -> IDOR / BOLA

**Step 3:** For each confirmed finding, document:
- **Title**: Concise, descriptive name
- **Severity**: Critical / High / Medium / Low / Info
- **Confidence**: High / Medium / Low
- **Category**: Which of the 8 categories it belongs to
- **Location**: `file_path:line_number`
- **Related Locations**: Additional supporting files when the verified root cause spans multiple files
- **CWE**: The applicable CWE identifier (if known)
- **Description**: What the issue is, in plain language
- **Evidence**: The actual vulnerable code snippet from the codebase
- **Impact**: What an attacker could achieve by exploiting this
- **Remediation**: Specific steps to fix, with corrected code example where possible

For each hardening observation, document:
- a concise title
- confidence
- category
- location
- rationale for why it stayed below the confirmed finding bar
- a narrow hardening suggestion

If a finding is about a missing control, the evidence must show both:
- the affected code path or configuration entry point
- the missing guard at that exact location (for example: route without auth, state-changing form without CSRF, GraphQL server without depth limits, container build without non-root user)

Set **Confidence** based on the evidence quality:
- **High**: the vulnerable path is explicit in code or config and exploitation conditions are clear
- **Medium**: the issue is well-supported but some runtime assumptions remain
- **Low**: the weakness is plausible and evidenced, but key runtime details are inferred

Keep remediation tightly scoped to the verified root cause shown in the evidence.
Do not add generic hardening advice unless it directly fixes the reported issue.
Use [cwe-mapping.md](references/cwe-mapping.md) to keep CWE choices consistent.
Use [finding-normalization.md](references/finding-normalization.md) to keep titles, ordering, IDs, and output parity stable.

**Step 4:** Write the complete report to `security-audit-report.md` and the machine-readable companion file to `security-audit-report.json` in the target directory root.

**Step 5:** Print a brief summary to the conversation:
- Total findings by severity
- Number of high-confidence findings
- Top 3 most critical findings
- Overall risk assessment (Critical / Poor / Fair / Good / Excellent)
- Paths to both report files

---

## Important Rules

1. **NEVER fabricate findings.** Every finding MUST reference a real file and line number from the codebase. If you cannot find evidence, do not report it.
2. **Verify before reporting.** Read surrounding code context (10-20+ lines) to confirm each finding is a true positive. Consider mitigating factors.
3. **Consider application context.** A finding in a public-facing API is more severe than the same issue in an internal CLI tool.
4. **Be thorough.** Read files completely when investigating a potential vulnerability. Do not skim.
5. **Report clean categories.** If a category has no findings, explicitly state "No issues found" in that section.
6. **Prioritize exploitability.** Rank findings by real-world exploitability, not just theoretical risk.
7. **Stay in scope.** Only scan the target directory. Do not scan excluded dependency, build, cache, or generated directories for application findings.
8. **Do not report by absence alone.** Missing package names, middleware names, decorators, or helper libraries are investigation hints, not findings by themselves.
9. **Prefer omission over speculation.** If you cannot prove exploitability from the scanned code or config, do not report the issue.
10. **Keep remediation specific.** Tie every fix recommendation to the evidence shown for that finding.
11. **Emit both outputs.** The Markdown and JSON reports must describe the same findings, severities, confidence levels, and clean categories.
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agent-rock

Directory Structure

SKILL.md

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